The NBER's Working Group on Market Design met in Cambridge October 20–21. Working Group Co-Directors Michael Ostrovsky of Stanford University and Parag A. Pathak of MIT organized the meeting. These researchers' papers were presented and discussed:
Haluk Ergin, University of California, Berkeley and Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver, Boston College, "Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange"
Nikhil Agarwal, MIT and NBER; Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University; Paulo J. Somaini, Stanford University and NBER; Michael A. Rees, University of Toledo Medical Center; and Daniel C. Waldinger, MIT, "An Empirical Framework for Sequential Assignments: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys"
Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER; Robin S. Lee, Harvard University and NBER; and John Shim, University of Chicago, "Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Market Competition and Innovation"
Albert Kyle, University of Maryland, and Jeongmin Lee, Washington University in St. Louis, "Toward a Fully Continuous Exchange"
Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal, Stanford University, "Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation"
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland; Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC; and Oleg V. Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder, "Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction"
Ulrich Doraszelski and Katja Seim, University of Pennsylvania and NBER; Michael Sinkinson, Yale University and NBER; and Peichun Wang, University of Pennsylvania, "Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction"(NBER Working Paper No. 23034)
New Directions: Transportation and Market Design
Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz, Google Research, "Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars"
Peter Cramton, University of Maryland; Richard Geddes, Cornell University; and Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne, "Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-Time Road Pricing"
Juan Camilo Castillo, Stanford University; Dan Knoepfle, Uber; and Glen Weyl, Microsoft Research, "Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase"
Parag A. Pathak and Peng Shi, MIT, "How Well Do Structural Demand Models Work? Counterfactual Predictions in School Choices"
Georgy Artemov, University of Melbourne; Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University; and Yinghua He, Rice University, "Strategic 'Mistakes': Implications for Market Design Research"
Jacob D. Leshno and Irene Y. Lo, Columbia University, "The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice"
Esen Onur, David Reiffen, and Lynn Riggs, Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and Haoxiang Zhu, MIT and NBER, "Mechanism Selection and Trade Formation on Swap Execution Facilities: Evidence from Index CDS Trades"
Constantinos Daskalakis, MIT; Christos H. Papadimitriou, University of California at Berkeley; and Christos Tzamos, Microsoft Research, "Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?"
Dirk Bergemann, Yale University, and Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris, Princeton University, "Information and Market Power"
New Directions: Development Economics and Market Design
Jean-François Houde, Cornell University and NBER; Terence R. Johnson, University of Notre Dame; Molly Lipscomb, University of Virginia; and Laura A. Schechter, University of Wisconsin at Madison, "Using Market Mechanisms to Increase the Take-up of Improved Sanitation in Senegal"
Reshmaan N. Hussam, Yale University, and Natalia Rigol and Benjamin N. Roth, MIT, "Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field"
Yusuke Narita, Yale University, "Experimental Design as Market Design: Billions of Dollars Worth of Treatment Assignments"
Summaries of these papers are at: